01765nas a2200193   4500000000100000000000100001008004100002653001800043653001800061653001700079653001900096100001100115245002900126856015000155300001200305490000600317520122800323022002001551                                       d10aEnd-in-itself10aHuman dignity10aHuman rights10aMoral autonomy1 aS. Gan00aHuman dignity as a right  uhttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-70350578552&doi=10.1007%2fs11466-009-0024-3&partnerID=40&md5=e83f2e2d810e91355fd2430a59eba135  a370-3840 v43 aThe concept of human dignity and the relationship between dignity and human rights have been important subjects in contemporary international academia. This article first analyzes the different understandings of the concept of dignity, which has left great influences in history (including the "theory of attribution-dignity", the "theory of autonomy-dignity" or the "theory of moral completeness/achievement-dignity", and the "theory of end-in-itself-dignity"); it then exposes the obvious defects of these modes of understanding; finally, it tries to define dignity as a moral right to be free from insult. Meanwhile, the relationship between human dignity and human rights is clarified as a result of this research: Rather than being the foundation of human rights, human dignity is one of human rights. The idea of dignity nevertheless has a particular status in ethics in that it embodies a kind of core moral concern, representing a basic demand rooted in the human self or individuality, and hence representing an important aspect of human rights. We may anticipate that sooner or later, the idea of human dignity will become, together with other human rights, the only intangible cultural heritage of human society.  a16733436 (ISSN)